Resumo. Hannah Arendt. Educação inicial. Agostinho de Hipona. Este artigo faz parte de uma investigação em andamento, na qual exploramos a leitura de arendtiana do Agostinho de Hipona, partindo da obra inicial, El concepto de amor en San Agustín (2001). Consideramos que a investigação da dissertação doutoral, obra tão pouco explorada pelos seus mais relevantes interpretes, pode brindarmos novas chaves de leitura da teoria política de Hannah Arendt, tornando mais complexo nossa abordagem na sua leitura heterodoxa da tradição do pensamento (...) filosófico. Segundo nossa hipótese é a tese doutoral de 1929, onde a dimensão política do problema num sentido amplo começa a emergir, a partir da questão do que é especificamente humano, sempre sujeito à constante tensão entre um “não mais” e um “ainda não” (Arendt, 2001: 311; Agustín, 2005: XI, 21,27). Somente em posteriores trabalhos a leitura da fonte agostiniana –focada cada vez mais nas Confesiones (2005) y na Ciudad de Dios (1958) fica articulada explicitamente com a elaboração da trama mais conhecida da fenomenologia da ação política; na qual numerosos e importantes interpretes tenham situado o giro embora da política da aluna do Heidegger e Jaspers (Young Bruehl, 2006; Canovan, 2002; Benhabib, 2000; Forti, 2001). Embora essas autoras reconheçam a formação inicial e sua influencia sobre a filósofa Arendt, em geral, todas elas acentuam a ruptura com todo o seu escopo de formação universitária em filosofia e teologia. (shrink)

Although marijuana use is highly prevalent among university students in Argentina, little is known about the factors that distinguish frequent marijuana users from sporadic users. For this reason, the present study investigated the possible variations in the contexts of consumption, motives for consumption, perceived norms, and protective behavioral strategies among university students with frequent or sporadic marijuana use, and analyzed the usefulness of this set of variables to distinguish between these two types of users. For this purpose, a sample of (...) 1083 Argentine university students completed an online survey on substance use. In particular, this work was conducted with the subsample that reported using marijuana in the last 30 days. The survey asked about marijuana use and associated negative consequences, as well as motives for use, perceived social norms, and protective behavioral strategies. As a result, frequent users had a higher number of negative consequences than sporadic users, and a distinctive profile was found on a set of variables. At the multivariate level, cheerleading motives, protective behavioral strategies, solo use, and college party use discriminated significantly between the two classes of users. Overall, the findings revealed heterogeneous subpopulations of marijuana users that differ not only in use and its consequences, but also in contexts of use and in a set of relevant variables. These distinct subpopulations require different and specific interventions. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

This chapter provides an overview of how existential phenomenology has influenced qualitative research methods across a range of disciplines across the social, health, educational, and psychological sciences. It focuses specifically on how the concepts of “existential structures,” or “existentials”—such as selfhood, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment—have been used in qualitative research. After providing a brief introduction to what qualitative research is and why philosophers should be interested in it, the chapter provides clear, straightforward examples of how qualitative researchers have used (...) existentials to analyze qualitative data and design qualitative studies. The chapter is intended to introduce philosophers to existential approaches to phenomenological qualitative research, with the aim of facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration. (shrink)

The algorithmic accountability literature to date has primarily focused on procedural tools to govern automated decision-making systems. That prescriptive literature elides a fundamentally empirical question: whether and under what circumstances, if any, is the use of algorithmic systems to make public policy decisions perceived as legitimate? The present study begins to answer this question. Using factorial vignette survey methodology, we explore the relative importance of the type of decision, the procedural governance, the input data used, and outcome errors on perceptions (...) of the legitimacy of algorithmic public policy decisions as compared to similar human decisions. Among other findings, we find that the type of decision—low importance versus high importance—impacts the perceived legitimacy of automated decisions. We find that human governance of algorithmic systems increases perceptions of the legitimacy of algorithmic decision-making systems, even when those decisions are likely to result in significant errors. Notably, we also find the penalty to perceived legitimacy is greater when human decision-makers make mistakes than when algorithmic systems make the same errors. The positive impact on perceived legitimacy from governance—such as human-in-the-loop—is greatest for highly pivotal decisions such as parole, policing, and healthcare. After discussing the study’s limitations, we outline avenues for future research. (shrink)

The rise of quantum information theory has lent new relevance to experimental tests for non-classicality, particularly in controversial cases such as adiabatic quantum computing superconducting circuits. The Leggett-Garg inequality is a “Bell inequality in time” designed to indicate whether a single quantum system behaves in a macrorealistic fashion. Unfortunately, a violation of the inequality can only show that the system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but subjected to a measurement technique that happens to disturb the system. The “clumsiness” (...) loophole (ii) provides reliable refuge for the stubborn macrorealist, who can invoke it to brand recent experimental and theoretical work on the Leggett-Garg test inconclusive. Here, we present a revised Leggett-Garg protocol that permits one to conclude that a system is either (i) non-macrorealistic or (ii) macrorealistic but with the property that two seemingly non-invasive measurements can somehow collude and strongly disturb the system. By providing an explicit check of the invasiveness of the measurements, the protocol replaces the clumsiness loophole with a significantly smaller “collusion” loophole. (shrink)

Certains des moments qui ont marqué la liesse de la révolte de 2019 et le rejet encore incompréhensible de la proposition constitutionnelle, qui reprenait une grande partie des revendications de la rue, sont déroulés sous forme de flashs. Passé, présent et futur se confondent dans ce récit et émergent d’une photographie autour de laquelle s’articulent ces mots : un homme en costume-cravate, un policier, une foule en révolte, un silence spectral.

In this essay I address the question, “What is the subject matter of phenomenological research?” I argue that in spite of the increasing popularity of phenomenology, the answers to this question have been brief and cursory. As a result, contemporary phenomenologists lack a clear framework within which to articulate the aims and results of their research, and cannot easily engage each other in constructive and critical discourse. Examining the literature on phenomenology’s identity, I show how the question of phenomenology’s subject (...) matter has been systematically neglected. It has been overshadowed by an unending concern with phenomenology’s methodological identity. However, an examination of recent contributions to this literature reveals that a concern with articulating phenomenology’s subject matter has gradually increased, although such articulations remain preliminary. In light of this, I delineate, define, and illustrate three layers of phenomenological research, which I term “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” While the delineation of these layers is drawn primarily from classical phenomenological texts, they are defined and illustrated through the use of more contemporary literature. Following the articulation of this subject matter, I briefly consider some of the debates—both foundational and applied—that can be facilitated by the adoption of this framework. (shrink)

Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There’s no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need (...) to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term “empathy” is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy—borrowed from theoretical psychology—has been a major factor in nurses’ negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy’s role in nursing. (shrink)

The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...) sections 2 and 3, I will discuss the two main existing conceptions of the conditions that a mental state must satisfy to count as an episode of remembering. The first of these approaches is backward-looking. It puts forward conditions that strictly concern the aetiology of the mental state. I will argue that the conditions offered by the backward-looking approach are both too strong and too weak: They rule out mental states which, intuitively, count as memories while including mental states which, intuitively, do not qualify as memories. The second approach is forward-looking. It puts forward conditions that only concern the use that the subject makes of the mental state while forming beliefs about their own life. I will argue that the conditions proposed by the forward-looking approach are both too weak and too strong as well. However, the discussion of the two approaches will allow us to extract some helpful lessons on the constraints that any proposal about the nature of remembering should respect. An alternative approach aimed at incorporating those lessons will be offered in section 4 by drawing on the literature on functionalism. In section 5, I will argue that this approach can, on the one hand, accommodate as memories those mental states which indicate that the backward-looking approach and the forward-looking approach are too strict while, on the other hand, excluding those mental states which suggest that the two alternative approaches are too permissive. Accordingly, I will conclude that construing memory along functionalist lines is a satisfactory approach to the nature of remembering. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...) are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 25-27.

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

Whenever the state of a biological system is not determined solely by present conditions but depends on its past history, we can say that the system has memory. Bacteria and bacteriophage use a variety of memory mechanisms, some of which seem to convey adaptive value. A genetic type of heritable memory is the programmed inversion of specific DNA sequences, which causes switching between alternative patterns of gene expression. Heritable memory can also be based on epigenetic circuits, in which a system (...) with two possible steady states is locked in one or the other state by a positive feedback loop. Epigenetic states have been observed in a variety of cellular processes, and are maintained by diverse mechanisms. Some of these involve alternative DNA methylation patterns that are stably transmitted to daughter molecules and can affect DNA–protein interactions (e.g., gene transcription). Other mechanisms exploit autocatalytic loops whereby proteins establish the proper conditions for their continued synthesis. Template polymers other than nucleic acids (e.g., components of the cell wall) may also propagate epigenetic states. Non‐heritable memory is exemplified by parasitic organisms that bear a signature of their previous host, such as host‐controlled modification of phage DNA or porin hitchhiking in predatory bacteria. The heterogeneous nature of the examples known may be indicative of widespread occurrence of memory mechanisms in bacteria and phage. However, the actual extent, variety and potential selective value of prokaryotic memory devices remain open questions, still to be addressed experimentally. BioEssays 24:512–518, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Recently, several scholars have argued in support of the idea that folk psychology involves a primary capacity for regulating our mental states and patterns of behavior in accordance with a bunch of shared social norms and routines :259–281, 2015; Zawidzki, Philosophical Explorations 11:193–210, 2008; Zawidzki, Mindshaping: A new framework for understanding human social cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2013). This regulative view shares with the classical Dennettian intentional stance its emphasis on the normative character of human socio-cognitive capacities. Given those similarities, (...) it makes sense to assess the regulative view by considering some of the classical arguments against the normative nature of the intentional stance :76–100, 1985; Stich, Philosophical Topics 12:39–62, 1981; Stich, The fragmentation of reason: Preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990). The aim of this paper is to argue that the priority that the regulative view lays on the pluralistic and regulative character of folk psychology leaves the theory well-placed to resist these arguments. In this sense, the regulative view possesses better theoretical options to defend the normative character of human social cognition. (shrink)

The problem of demarcating science from nonscience remains unsolved. This article executes an analytical process of elimination of different demarcation proposals put forward since the professionalization of the philosophy of science, explaining why each of those proposals is unsatisfactory or incomplete. Then, it elaborates on how to execute an alternative multicriterial scientific demarcation project put forward by Mahner. This project allows for the demarcation not only of science from non-science and from pseudoscience, but also of different types of sciences and (...) of scientific fields from each other. This article also offers arguments in favor of accepting two types of scientific demarcations, namely epistemic-warrant scientific demarcations and territorial scientific demarcations, and argues in favor of accepting a territorially broad scientific demarcation. (shrink)

This study relies on the qualitative research method proposed by Verstehen, which seeks to understand the importance of the factors that influence social and historical events. This methodology is based on the idea that every social situation is supported by a web of meaning created by its participants. Based on the theory of anti-radicalism education, as developed by KH. Hasyim Muzadi, it is emphasized that radicalism does not necessarily define the Indonesian people. On the other hand, the ongoing reform process (...) in Indonesia has inadvertently allowed radical and extremist organizations to gain influence in society. As a result, Indonesia is now facing the negative consequences of the increasing global trend of radicalism and even terrorism. However, we could eliminate radicalism by highlighting the Pancasila, which advocates for ideas of fairness, democracy, and humanism. The study demonstrates the efforts of UIN Sayyid Ali Rahmatullah Tulungagung, an Indonesian State Islamic university, in promoting religious moderation through various programs. The initiatives aimed at promoting religious moderation include Ma'had Al-Jami'ah for strengthening the moderate aswaja ideology, Madin for reinforcing tolerant Indonesian fiqh, courses in religious moderation, a religious moderation survey, the Pioneer Orientation Program for emphasizing religious moderation, and the Institute for Javanese Islamic Research as a research center for religious moderation. Sholawat At-Takhdim is recognized as an official symbol for promoting religious moderation education. (shrink)

Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...) shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas. (shrink)

Our sense of entitlement influences our interactions and attitudes in a range of specific relational contexts, one of them being aging parents’ relationships with their adult children. This study aimed to examine the factor structure of the Sense of Relational Entitlement—aging parents toward their offspring, an 11-item questionnaire that assesses aging people’s sense of relational entitlement toward their children, and examine the associations of its subscales with related personality and mental health constructs. One thousand and six participants, aged 65–99, with (...) at least one child, completed the SRE-ao, Brief Symptom Inventory, Loneliness Scale, and General Belongingness scale. The SRE-ao demonstrated good construct structure using confirmatory factor analysis. Both SRE-ao subscales were significantly and positively associated with anxiety, depression, somatization and sense of loneliness and negatively with sense of belonging. When all variables were entered into a regression model, age, anxiety, and low sense of belonging, but not sense of loneliness, positively predicted both restricted and inflated sense of entitlement. Somatization negatively predicted inflated sense of entitlement. The SRE-ao is a reliable and valid scale that can be used in clinical practice and research to enhance our understanding of parent–child relationships throughout the lifespan. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible world (...) semantics, correspondence theory, and modality and quantification. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an account of self-knowledge for desires. According to this account, we form beliefs about our own desires on the basis of our grounds for those desires. First, I distinguish several types of desires and their corresponding grounds. Next, I make the case that we usually believe that we have a certain desire on the basis of our grounds for it. Then, I argue that a belief formed thus is epistemically privileged. Finally, I compare this account (...) to two other similar accounts of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Lack of guidance and regulation for authorizing medical cannabis for conditions involving the health and neurodevelopment of children is ethically problematic as it promulgates access inequities, risk-benefit inconsistencies, and inadequate consent mechanisms. In two virtual sessions using participatory action research and consensus-building methods, we obtained perspectives of stakeholders on ethics and medical cannabis for children and youth. The sessions focused on the scientific and regulatory landscape of medical cannabis, surrogate decision-making and assent, and the social and political culture of medical (...) cannabis. We found that evidence-gathering and data dissemination, pressures on clinical relationships, and the lack of integration of culturally diverse perspectives and Indigenous knowledges were key areas of concern. Participants emphasized the importance of utilizing adaptive study designs, highlighted the importance of trust-building between clinicians, patients and caregivers, and discussed barriers including historical and ongoing stigmatization of medical cannabis. We conclude that continued public consultation and strength-based research that integrate diverse perspectives are critical steps forward. (shrink)

In this paper we shall draw on Peirce’s four methods of fixating belief to provide a template for examining classroom experience. Such a template provides a context for understanding the dynamics that emerge at the intersection of existing belief and new experience. We shall develop several examples of tenacity as an impediment to student growth, discuss traditional responses to the irrationally tenacious student, develop Peirce’s four methods in the context of an educational setting, and draw conclusions from his work for (...) educational theory. Our belief is not that tenacity inevitably works against the cultivation of critical awareness, but that this virtue needs to be tempered by a full purview of educational aims and their attending virtues. (shrink)

We discuss a mass change that has its origin in the action of forces on an object. This phenomenon, well-known in the context of quantum field theory (mass renormalization), can be discussed systematically in both classical and quantum mechanics in a framework given by Stückelberg. We employ this framework to resolve an interesting conflict of opinions between Schopenhauer and Hegel in the mid-19th century. We show that Hegel, Kant, and Schopenhauer demonstrated remarkable prescience in their views as seen from a (...) modern perspective. (shrink)

Islam; doctrines; Islamic ethics; Islamic preaching.